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UNION GROWTH IN THE NETHERLANDS: 1961-1987 
Jan van Ours1 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of union growth in the 
Netherlands over the past decades. The analysis shows that the 
effect of changes in the industrial structure is very small. It 
appears that both in the short and in the long run union growth is 
influènced by the labour income ratio and by unemployment. If the 
labour income ratio rises (because real wage increases more than 
labour productivity) or if unemployment declines union membership 
increases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Unions in the Netherlands are organized by industry. Most of 
these uriions cooperate at a national level and belong to one of 
the union federations FNV, CNV or MHP23. This paper is concerned 
with developments in union membership at the national level. After 
a steady growth in the sixties and seventies union membership 
declined substantially in the beginning of the eighties from 1.8 
min in 1980 to 1.5 min in 1985 (see figure 1). In recent years 
there has been a small recovery. The largest union federation, the 
FNV had 1.05 min members in 1980, 0.90 min members in 1985 and 
about 1.0 min members in 1990. 
Figure 1 Union growth in the Netherlands: 1961-1989 
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 The FNV (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging) originated in 
1982 from the amalgamation of the Socialist federation N W 
(Nationaal Verbond van Vakverenigingen) and the Catholic 
federation NKV (Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond). For the period 
before 1982 we take the sum of N W and NKV-membership as the 
membership of the FNV. The CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond) 
is a Protestant union federation. In 1975 the MHP (Vakcentrale 
voor Middelbaar en Hoger personeel), a union federation especially 
for white collar workers unions was established. 
3
 Data on union membership in this paper are from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics. Union density is defined as a share of 
employment. The data used in the time series analysis are shown in 
Appendix 1. 
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One of the most interesting questions when looking at long 
term union growth is the stability of union density. Is this 
density stable over a long period of time or are there tendencies 
for decline caused by changes in the sectoral structure of the 
Dutch economy, with low density sectors growing faster than high 
density sectors. 
Figure 2 shows union density, defined as a share of 
employment. Union density remained quite stable in the sixties and 
seventies but declined substantially in the eighties, total union 
density was about 38-40% in the sixties, increasing somewhat in 
the seventies. In the eighties the total union density declined 
from 43% to 33%. FNV union density was about 25% in the sixties 
and seventies and decreased in the beginning of the eighties to 
19% in 1985, to remain stable in later years. 
Figure 2 Union densitv in the Netherlands: 1961-1989 
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This paper is about union growth in the Netherlands. We are 
especially interested in the determinants of the decline in union 
membership in the beginning of the eighties. To investigate the 
determinants of union growth we perform both a decomposition 
analysis and a time series analysis. The decomposition analysis 
disentangles the effects of changing industrial structure and the 
effect of changing union membership within sectors. The time 
series analysis investigates the influence of other determinants. 
In time series studies of union growth the dependent variable 
is usually either the rate of growth of union membership or union 
density. This paper uses the rate of growth of union membership as 
the dependent variable and uses lagged union density as one of the 
explanatory variables. Apart from lagged union density we use 
explanatory variables specified in levels as well as in first 
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differences. Our interpretation of the variables specified in 
levels is that they represent a long term relationship, while the 
first difference variables represent short term effects. We use 
co-integration analysis to test for long term relationships, and 
estimate a first difference equation to analyze short term 
fluctuations. In doing this we attempt to determine whether or not 
the sharp decline in union density in the beginning of the 
eighties is a short term deviation from a long term development or 
a structural break. 
Data on union membership are collected by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) on a quarterly basis for unions belonging to 
the federations FNV, CNV or MHP. A CBS-survey among all unions is 
only undertaken every two years. Total union membership data are 
therefore not available for every year: yearly data for non-
survey years are constructed by averaging over two surveys. In the 
decomposition analysis in section 3 we use the data from the 
survey held every two years. For our time series analysis we 
employ annual data. We restrict our analysis to FNV union 
membership*. 
This paper is set up as follows. In section 2 we briefly 
discuss theory of union membership and some empirical studies. 
Section 3 describes developments in union membership both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. We present a decomposition of 
union density in a sectoral and non-sectoral part, from which it 
appears that changes in the sectoral structure only added a small 
contribution to the decline in union density. Furthermore, we 
present some information on inflows to and outflows from unions. 
In section 4 we present the results of the time series analysis of 
union growth. Section 5 concludes. 
4
 Data on the MHP union federation only exist since 1975. 
CNV-data are less suitable for time series analysis because the 
number of CNV-members shows some large fluctuations, due to 
individual unions joining this federation. 
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2. UNION MEMBERSHIP: THEORY AND EMPIRIGAL RESEARCH 
From the perspective of the individual worker the decision to 
become a union member depends in theory on the costs and benefits 
connected to that membership. Theory on union membership, however, 
is not developed to a high degree of sophistication. Membership 
studies usually just mention the factors involved, like the 
individuals' expected benefits of higher wages, greater employment 
security or better working conditions when joining a union. A 
reduced form model is then estimated, with a focus on the analysis 
of the effects of changes in the economie environment on union 
membership. The dependent variable is either the change in the 
number of union members or union density. When using the change in 
the number of union members as the dependent variable, lagged 
union density is often used as an explanatory variable, which is 
supposed to have a negative effect on union growth due to a 
'saturation effect': if the density gets higher it is more 
difficult to persuade the remaining non-union members to become a 
union member and union growth will become less. 
Explanatory variables usually refer to economie conditions: 
prices, wages, employment and unemployment. Other explanatory 
variables used in empirical analysis are for example: political 
environment, strikes, government expenditures on social benefits. 
Rising prices are supposed to induce union growth due to a 
'threat effect'. Rising prices are a threat to the standards of 
living of workers. Rising nominal wages are usually also expected 
to induce union growth because of the credit workers attribute to 
the unions. 
Employment and union membership are also positively related. 
If the union is as attractive to new workers as it is to incumbent 
workers a growth of employment will automatically lead to a growth 
of union membership. 
The influence of unemployment is ambiguous. Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel (1969) use unemployment in the preceding trough of the 
business cycle as explanatory variable, because this is supposed 
to represent workers stock of grievances. Therefore a positive 
influence is expected: the larger this unemployment variable, the 
more workers are inclined to become a union member. There is 
however also an argument in favour of a negative relation between 
unemployment and union membership. The higher unemployment the 
stronger the position of employers on the labour market. Therefore 
workers may be less willing to risk employer retaliation by being 
union members. 
Political environment may influence union growth because some 
political parties are supposed to be more 'pro-union' than others. 
A change in the political scène may therefore have its effects on 
union growth. 
Strikes may induce workers to join unions in order to receive 
a strike pay or because of the public relations: strikes may 
favour the charisma of the unions. 
Finally, increasing government expenditure on social benefits 
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may have a negative influence on union growth, if government is 
taking over some of the unions former tasks, thus making the 
unions less attractive to workers. 
It is not the intention of this paper to give an extensive 
survey of studies on union growth. A brief survey suffices to show 
that there are many differences between studies, not only with 
respect to the kind of explanatory variables used in the analysis, 
but also with respect to the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
there are differences in the way economie variables appear to 
influence union growth. 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) use consumer prices, 
unemployment and employment as explanatory variables in their 
seminal study on US union growth. All of these factors have a 
positive influence on union growth. Furthermore, they find a 
positive relationship between union growth and the percentage of 
Democrats in the House of Representatives, from which they 
conclude that pro-union sentiment leads to a greater demand for 
union representation by unorganized workers. Finally they find a 
negative influence of the union density variable. 
Bain and Elsheikh (1976) in their study of UK union growth 
find a positive influence of prices and wages, but a negative 
influence of unemployment. Union density has a negative influence. 
A study of German union growth by Schnabel (1987) also 
concludes that wages and prices have a positive influence. 
Schnabel finds that the level of unemployment in year t-1 has a 
negative influence on union growth in year t, while unemployment 
in year t has a positive influence of about the same size. So, 
there is no long term influence of unemployment on union 
membership. Finally, Schnabel finds a positive influence of the 
number of strikes, but no influence from lagged union density. 
Carruth and Disney (1988) analyzing UK union growth, find a 
positive influence of employment, a negative influence of 
unemployment and - surprisingly - a negative influence of wages. 
Carruth and Disney use the previous year's union density as an 
error correction term in their estimates. The coëfficiënt of this 
error correction term appears to be significant, which seems to 
imply that union density is stable over long periods of time. 
Recent examples of studies which use union density as the 
dependent variable are by Booth (1983) and Neumann and Rissman 
(1984). Booth finds that prices and wages have a positive 
influence on UK union density, while actual unemployment has a 
negative and previous unemployment has a positive influence. In 
the long run union density only depends on prices and wages. 
Neumann and Rissman find a positive influence on US union 
density of prices, employment and unemployment. Furthermore, they 
find a positive influence of the fraction of representation 
elections won by unions and a negative influence of government 
expenditures on social welfare (expressed as a fraction of GNP). 
The latter phenomenon is ascribed as a substitution from union 
services to government services, which makes union membership less 
attractive. Neumann and Rissman also present a decomposition 
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analysis of changes in union density from which it appears that 
about 45% of the decline in union density may be attributed to 
secular changes in the structure of employment by industry. 
With respect to the influence of economie variables most 
studies only have one effect in common: rising prices have a 
positive influence on union membership. The evidence on the 
influence of nominal wages is mixed. Some studies do not 
investigate this influence, whilst most studies that do, find a 
positive influence with the remarkable exception of Carruth and 
Disney (1988). Employment appears to have a positive influence on 
union growth, which is not surprising. The influence of 
unemployment is unclear. There seems to be a difference between US 
and UK studies, the former finding a positive, the latter a 
negative influence. Perhaps this is due to the fact that in the US 
short term fluctuations in unemployment prevail, whereas in the 
UK, especially in the seventies and eighties, there was a strong 
increase in unemployment. If union density is used as an 
explanatory variable its influence is usually negative, this is 
consistent with the saturation hypothesis. An alternative 
explanation is that (lagged) union density is part of a long-run 
equilibrium relationship, whereas the influence of the other 
factors attributes to short run fluctuations. 
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3. UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS: 1961-1987 
Each country has its own characteristics in political and 
legal structure. Structural differences may attribute to 
differences in union growth. In this section, we start with a 
brief survey of the characteristics of the Dutch labour market, 
with a focus on the role of the labour unions (see for a survey of 
Dutch unions: Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman, 1983, and for a survey 
of industrial relations in the Netherlands in the past decades: 
Van de Wijngaert, 1990). 
The main task of labour unions in the Netherlands is to 
negotiate on wages and non-wage working conditions, to offer 
special services to their members (for example legal support) and 
to pay benefits when it comes to strikes. Unions have no task in 
paying social benefits to unemployed workers. 
Employers and unions negotiate on wages in the context of 
important laws on collective agreements between individual or 
groups of employers and unions. These laws provide a legal status 
to collective agreements, and make it possible for the results of 
multi-employer negotiations also to apply to non-union members and 
employers not present at the bargaining table. Over the last 
decades negotiations were usually on real wages. Wages are 
protected from price inflation by cost of living allowances based 
on changes in the national consumer price index. Then the bottom 
line in the negotiations is last years real wage. In the beginning 
of the eighties the unions gave up this automatic price indexation 
in exchange for shorter working hours, which was thought to reduce 
unemployment. 
There is also a strong government influence on wage 
negotiations. In the fifties there was a 'strictly guided wage 
policy': the government decided the wage increases of the workers. 
There were no actual wage negotiations between employers and 
unions. Since the sixties, unions and employers negotiated over 
the wages but in the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, 
there were government interventions if the negotiation results 
were deemed harmful to the national economy. These wage controls 
did not occur later on in the eighties. 
Union membership does not provide a direct wage benefit for 
the individual. Negotiation results achieved by labour unions are 
also granted to non-union members. There is definitely a f ree 
rider problem here5. 
Figure 3 shows the development of unemployment and the labour 
income ratio over the period 1961-1989. In the sixties 
unemployment fluctuated between 50,000 and 100,000. In the first 
half of the seventies unemployment increased to 300,000 to remain 
stable in the rest of the seventies. In the period 1980-83 
unemployment rosé sharply to reach a maximum of 820,000 in 1984, 
5
 There is no closed shop except in the printing industries, 
where every worker is obliged to become a union member. 
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since then unemployment has decreased somewhat6. It is obvious 
that the decline in union membership at the beginning of the 
eighties must have something to do with the deterioration of the 
Dutch labour market in that period, when unemployment grew 
explosively. 
Figure 3 Unemployment and labour income ratio: 1961-1989 
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Another important determinant of union growth may be the 
negotiations result in terms of real wages. 
Workers will try to get a fair share of the value added in 
production. An indicator of this share is the labour income 
ratio7. If real wages rise as fast as labour productivity the 
labour income ratio remains constant. If real wages rise faster 
than labour productivity the labour income ratio increases, while 
firms profit decrease8. The labour income ratio fluctuates in the 
6
 The unemployment data presented in figure 3 are from the 
public employment office according to which in 1989 there were 
660,000 unemployed workers. In recent years the official number of 
unemployed workers is estimated by panel surveys in combination 
with data from the public employment offices. The resulting number 
is thus considerably lower; in 1989 it was 390,000. The difference 
between both numbers for 1989 is mainly due to the fact that the 
registration of public employment offices lags behind actual 
developments in workers finding jobs. 
7
 The labour income ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum 
of gross wages and assigned wage of the self employed to the gross 
added value. 
8
 The relationship between labour income ratio, real wages 
and labour productivity holds exactly only if producer prices are 
used to calculate real wages. 
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sixties and seventies and increases from 69% in 1961 to a maximum 
of 81% in 1975. In the period 1980-1985 the labour income ratio 
decreases rapidly to 70% and fluctuates in the years afterwards. 
Of course, union growth is not only influenced by cyclical 
factors. Union growth may also be influenced by secular trends, 
like changes in industrial structure from highly unionized sectors 
to low unionized sectors. To analyze the influence of sectoral 
changes in employment on union density we performed a so called 
shift-share analysis. This analysis decomposes the change in union 
density into three parts: the change in the sectoral structure 
holding union density per sector constant, the change in union 
density within sectors, holding sectoral structure constant, and 
the product of both changes: 
AD = SJDJAEJ + SJEJAD^ + S^ADJAEJ [1] 
in which: Dj «• union density in sector j 
Ej - number of employees in sector j 
We performed this shift-share analysis for two periods: 1973-79 
and 1979-87. In the first period, union density did not change 
much, whilst in the second period it declined rapidly. The results 
are shown in table 1. 
Table 1 Decomposition of chanpes in union density (%)a 
Total FNV 
73-79 79-87 73-79 79-87 
Sectoral structure (DAE) -0.8 -0.3 -1.6 -1.4 
Sectoral density (EAD) 1.8 -9.8 -1.8 -7.2 
Interaction (ADAE) -0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.5 
Total (AD) 1.0 -10.2 -3.3 -8.1 
a) The calculations are based on an industrial structure of 8 
sectors 
From table 1, it appears that the contribution of sectoral 
changes to changes in total and FNV union density is marginal in 
both periods, as compared to the contribution of changes of union 
density within sectors. The huge decline in union density can 
almost entirely be attributed to the latter factor. From this we 
conclude that the influence of sectoral changes on union density 
is negligible. So, there appears to be no secular negative trend 
influence from changes in industry structures. This conclusion is 
surprising, given that other studies have stressed the importance 
of changes in industrial structure. As stated before Neumann and 
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Rissman found that these changes explained almost half of the 
changes in union density9. 
Starting in 1973, the two-yearly CBS-survey on union 
membership also provides information on inflows in and outflows 
from unions. Table 2 gives an overview of this information. From 
this table it appears that the inflow of new members has decreased 
in the seventies and especially in the beginning of the eighties. 
Since 1986 the inflow has increased. The outflow which remained 
more or less stable in the seventies and the beginning of the 
eighties has decreased since 1984. The conclusion which may be 
drawn from table 2 is that the decline in union membership in the 
beginning of the eighties and the increase afterwards was due to 
fluctuations in the inflow of new members. The recession in the 
beginning of the eighties did not lead to union members giving up 
membership but led to a decrease in the flow of new union members. 
Apparently, union membership became less attractive to workers who 
were not yet union members. A possible reason for this is the rise 
in unemployment, which unions obviously were not able to prevent. 
Also real wages hardly increased or even decreased, which was 
another sign of weakness: the declining labour income ratio 
underlined the weak position of the unions. In the second half of 
the eighties unions regained some of their former charisma: 
employment was rapidly growing, unemployment decreasing and real 
wages increasing again. Yet, the growth in union membership was 
insufficiënt to raise union density. 
Table 2 Inflow to and outflow from labour unions (%/vear of total 
union members at the beeinning of that vear) 
Inflow Outflow Net growth 
1972/3 12.4 11.0 1.4 
1974/5 11.9 10.7 1.2 
1976/7 11.4 10.0 1.4 
1978/9 10.2 9.7 0.6 
1980/1 8.3 11.1 -2.8 
1982/3 7.3 10.0 -2.7 
1984/5 6.1 8.8 -2.8 
1986/7 8.3 7.7 0.5 
1988/9 10.9 7.2 3.7 
Source: CBS Union survey, held in March every two years 
9
 Visser (1987), performing a shift share analysis over the 
period 1979-1985, finds that, of the decline in union density in 
the Netherlands, about one third may be attibuted to changes in 
industrial stucture. 
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4. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP 
From the discussion in section 3 on the institutional 
structure of the Dutch labour market it is obvious that not all 
explanatory variables used in other studies on union growth are 
equally suitable for an analysis of union growth in the 
Netherlands. Government expenditure on social benefits, for 
example, is an irrelevant variable since the unions never had that 
task in the period of analysis. Political variables do not seem to 
be important either. Since World War II Christen Democrats have 
been in power, sometimes in coalition with the Socialists and 
sometimes with the Conservative-Liberal party. Drastic changes in 
the political environment have therefore never occurred, so we do 
not expect an influence from politics on union growth. Finally, 
prices will not influence union growth much, because from the end 
of the sixties until the beginning of the eighties there was a 
price indexation of the wages. Negotiations are, for a large part 
of the period of analysis, on real wages. Workers will also be 
interested in the rise in real wage compared to the rise in firms 
prof its, so they will be interested in the development of labour 
income ratio. 
We analyze developments in the period 1961-1989. We omitted 
the fifties from the analysis because in this period there were no 
actual wage negotiations between employers and unions. Wages as 
well as prices were determined by government policy uniformly over 
sectors. 
We want to investigate short term fluctuations in union 
growth as well as long term relationships. We therefore use a co-
integration approach (Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus, we specify a 
dynamic short run relationship between union growth and a number 
of economie variables, which places a constraint on the long run 
equilibrium relationship. For the long run equilibrium 
relationship we use union density as the explanatory variable. In 
this way our analysis can be compared with other studies which use 
the growth rate of union membership as the dependent variable and 
lagged union density as one of the explanatory variables. Instead 
of using the density variable as an indication for saturation we 
use the density variable as part of a long term equilibrium 
relationship. 
Variables which are evolving over time often have time series 
which are non-stationary. Stationarity of these time series may be 
obtained by first differencing once, in which case the original 
series is integrated of order one. According to co-integration 
theory, a linear combination of variables integrated of order one 
may be stationary. In that case, these variables are co-
integrated: the error term of a co-integration regression will not 
drift from zero and the co-integration variables may be used as 
explanatory variables in a first difference regression (see for a 
summary of co-integration literature: Vogelvang, 1990). 
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Table 3 Testing for unit roots: yearly data 1961-1989° 
ADF ADFC 
M (FNV) union members 0.28 -1.66 
D union density 1.54 0.19 
U unemployment 1.22 -1.10 
P consumer prices 2.45 -0.85 
L nominal wage 0.35 -2.04 
Lr real wage (L/P) -2.88 * -3.88* 
S strikes -0.88 -3.71* 
A labour income ratio 0.32 -2.20 
DF DFc 
AM -3.88 * -3.83 * 
AD -3.82 * -4.20 * 
AU -3.34 * -3.70 * 
AP -2.09 * -3.57 * 
AL -1.24 -1.67 
ALr -2.85 * -3.80 * 
AS -7.32 * -7.21 * 
AA -4.70 * -4.64 * 
a) Logs of variables; ADFC estimation with constant; ADFt 
estimation with constant and time trend 
*: differs significantly negative from zero at 5% level 
critical 5% values: (A)DF: -1.95, (A)DFC: -3.00, ADFt: -3.60 
A necessary condition for time series to be co-integrated is 
that each series is integrated of the same order. The hypothesis 
that a time series is integrated of order one, can be determined 
by testing whether that series has a unit root. For this we use 
the (Augmented) Dickey Fuller tests. Table 3 shows the results for 
the series we use in our analysis. 
We estimated Augmented Dickey Fuller values in regressions 
without a constant term, in regressions with a constant term and 
in regressions with both a constant term and a time trend. 
Comparing the ADF-values from the different regressions it is 
obvious that only a few differ significantly negative from zero. 
There are differences between the ADF-values of regressions 
without a constant, with a constant and with both a constant and a 
time trend. For the real wage series the ADF value of the 
regressions with and without a constant differs significantly from 
zero. In the regressions with both a constant and a time trend the 
ADF value does not differ significantly from zero. Real wages have 
been growing rapidly especially in the sixties. So the inclusion 
of a time trend in the regressions may be necessary. Therefore we 
prefer the ADF value of the regressions with both a constant and a 
time trend. For the series of strikes the ADF value of the 
regressions with a constant and with both a constant and a time 
trend differ significantly from zero. In a regression without a 
ADFt 
-1.57 
-0.81 
-2.01 
-0.79 
0.12 
-1.25 
-4.12 * 
-1.64 
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constant the ADF value does not differ significantly from zero. 
Given the development of the number of strikes in the Netherlands, 
which has definetely no positive or negative trend, we prefer the 
latter ADF value. Therefore we conclude that none of the ADF 
values differs significantly (negative) from zero at a 5% level, 
so the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. 
For the first differences of the variables we used Dickey 
Fuller tests, from which it appears that first differences clearly 
do not have a unit root, except for nominal wages. So nomina! 
wages are probably integrated of order 2. 
For the co-integration regression we use union density as an 
explanatory variable and we can use as explanatory variables the 
variables which have a unit-root: unemployment, real wages and 
labour income ratio and strikes10. The estimation results of the 
co-integration regressions are shown in table 4. 
Table 4 Co-integration regressions: 1961-1989 
Dependent variable: D (logs of union density) 
Const U A Lr S R2 ADF 
-1.11 -0.062 - - - 0.419 -1.07 
-7.02 - 1.29 - - 0.345 -1.41 
-1.73 - - -0.15 - 0.110 -0.62 
0.18 -0.151 - 0.44 - 0.644 -2.47 
0.61 -0.178 - 0.51 -0.45 0.715 -1.50 
-7.00 -0.065 1.37 - - 0.840 -3.89 
-6.88 -0.068 1.36 - -0.01 0.840 -3.28 
Since we do not have long time series we use simple co-integration 
tests. We calculated the Augmented Dickey-Fuller values to test 
the null hypothesis that the variables are not co-integrated. From 
table 4 it appears that if we use either unemployment, labour 
income ratio or real wages as single explanatory variable in the 
equation, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The same holds for 
the combination of unemployment and real wages as explanatory 
variables. Adding the strikes to this combination does not help. 
Only if we use both unemployment and the labour income ratio as 
explanatory variables we are able to reject the null hypothesis. 
Adding strikes as explanatory variable has no use. Therefore we 
conclude that only union density, unemployment and the labour 
income ratio are co-integrated. 
Having thus established the co-integration relation we 
derived our short run estimates, the results of which are shown in 
table 5. The dependent variable used is the change in union 
membership, explanatory variables are the change in unemployment, 
10
 We could use prices as well, but without nominal wages 
this does not seem very useful. 
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the change in labour income ratio and the lagged residuals of the 
co-integration equation. The estimate shows that both the change 
in labour income ratio and the lagged residuals from the co-
integration variables are significant at a 5% level. The change in 
unemployment is significant at a 10% level. In the second estimate 
we used instead of the lagged residuals the lagged variables of 
the co-integration equation themselves as explanatory variables. 
The results of both estimates do not differ very much. 
Table 5 Estimation results: 1962-1989 
Dependent variable: AM (rate of growth of union membership) 
AU AA D(-l) U(-l) A(-l) z(-l) R2 DW 
-0.033 0.58 - - - 0.34 0.492 1.82 
(1.8) (4.0) (3.7) 
-0.040 0.52 -0.35 -0.026 0.50 - 0.467 1.93 
(1.8) (3.1) (3.6) (3.5) (2.9) 
z - 7 + D + 0.065 U - 1.37 A 
t-values between parentheses 
to save space the values of the constant are not presented in this 
table 
For both equations we also performed the Chow test for parameter 
constancy, splitting up the sample in two periods (1962-1979 and 
1980-89). This test indicated that there has been no structural 
break in either equation when union membership started to decline 
rapidly. 
Finally we used the results of the second estimate to 
simulate the developments in union membership over the past 
decades. The results of these simulations are shown in figure 4. 
Figure 4 Union growth: actual development and simulation 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Union membership in the Netherlands has grown in the sixties 
and seventies and kept up with the growth of employment. This led 
to a rather stable union density. In the beginning of the eighties 
union membership showed a remarkable decline while only in recent 
years there has been some recovery. 
We performed a shift share analysis on union densities to 
disentangle the effect of a changing industrial structure from the 
effect of changes in union densities within sectors. It appears 
that the effect of changes in the industrial structure is very 
small. 
This paper also presents a time series analysis of union 
growth in the Netherlands. From this analysis it appears that 
short term fluctuations in union growth may be attributed to 
changes in the labour income ratio and unemployment. If the labour 
income ratio rises (because real wages increase more than labour 
productivity) or if unemployment declines, union membership 
increases. In the long run union density also depends on the 
labour income ratio and unemployment. The higher the labour income 
ratio or the lower the unemployment, the higher union density. 
Using our estimation results we conclude that the rapid 
decline of union density in the beginning of the eighties has 
nothing to do with changes in the industrial structure. About 60% 
of the decline may be attributed to the decline in the labour 
income ratio and about 40% to the growth of unemployment. 
The strategy of the Dutch labour unions in the eighties was 
to moderate demands in wage negotiations in order to reduce 
unemployment. With respect to union membership, it is not obvious 
that this policy was the right one. Union membership is more 
sensitive to changes in the labour income ratio than it is to 
changes in unemployment. However, it not obvious either that union 
policy in thé eighties was wrong. Higher wage demands might have 
increased unemployment even more, so the growth of union 
membership due to higher wages might have been less than the loss 
in union membership due to higher unemployment. 
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Appendix 1 Data used in the analvsis 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
1961 925 3660 .253 44 27 2.40 43 69 
1962 931 3733 .249 41 28 2.62 24 70 
1963 950 3785 .251 41 28 2.80 104 72 
1964 933 3862 .242 38 30 3.21 53 72 
1965 947 3898 .243 42 33 3.49 60 72 
1966 982 3926 .250 54 33 3.84 20 75 
1967 988 3914 .252 102 35 4.11 8 74 
1968 966 3955 .244 94 37 4.45 11 74 
1969 963 4015 .240 73 39 4.89 28 74 
1970 1017 4064 .250 69 40 5.65 124 76 
1971 1024 4083 .251 91 43 6.43 25 78 
1972 1028 4060 .253 145 46 7.14 58 77 
1973 1063 4060 .262 151 50 8.14 29 77 
1974 1032 4060 .254 181 54 9.47 41 79 
1975 1055 4033 .262 260 61 10.76 15 81 
1976 1048 4064 .258 278 66 11.58 28 78 
1977 1067 4130 .258 271 71 12.80 44 78 
1978 1077 4175 .258 273 73 13.64 32 78 
1979 1070 4229 .253 281 76 14.54 57 79 
1980 1054 4362 .242 325 81 15.28 22 80 
1981 1025 4374 .234 480 87 16.05 11 77 
1982 999 4377 .228 655 92 17.03 12 76 
1983 960 4364 .220 801 94 17.20 9 74 
1984 916 4373 .209 822 98 17.34 11 70 
1985 903 4473 .202 761 100 17.72 45 69 
1986 901 4621 .195 711 100 17.95 35 71 
1987 911 4691 .194 686 99 18.27 28 73 
1988 932 4842 .192 682 101 18.56 38 71 
1989 967 4985 .194 658 102 19.01 27 70 
I - Number of FNV union members as measured at December 31 
of each year as measured by the quarterly CBS survey 
II = Number of employees: CBS, OECD and authors' 
calculations 
III - Union density: I/II 
IV - Number of unemployed: Central Planning Bureau (CPB) 
V - Consumer price index (1985-100): CBS 
VI - Nominal hourly wage rate (guilders/hour): CBS 
VII - Number of strikes: CBS 
VIII- Labour income ratio: CPB 
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